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What is the content of the common law 
obligation of good faith in commercial 
franchises?∗ 
Bill Dixon• 
 
 
 This article examines how lower courts in Australia have given content to the implied 
 common law obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement in the 
 context of franchise relationships.  Specifically, observations are made concerning the impact of  
 the implied obligation on commercial franchisors.  While commercial franchisors are not 
 obliged to put aside self-interest, it will be demonstrated that due regard must be paid to the 
 reasonable expectations engendered by the franchise relationship to avoid allegations of acting in 
 a manner contrary to the implied obligation.  Finally, it is suggested that the conclusions 
 reached in the franchise context are consistent with the more general trend of recent Australian 
 lower court authority, namely, that the content of the implied good faith obligation is increasingly 
 likely to be based on the reasonable expectations or legitimate interests of the contractual parties. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In an earlier article,1 the suggestion was made that the express recognition of good faith as a 
“relational” concept offered a structured path forward for the resolution of common law claims 
arising from commercial contracts. Adopting this approach, a distinction was drawn between 
commercial contracts that were relational in nature and those that were not.2 On this basis, only in 
commercial contracts that were relational in nature should a common law obligation of good faith in 
contractual performance and enforcement be implied as a contractual term, as a matter of law. 
However, within the confines of that article, it was not possible to explore the likely content of any 
such implied obligation. 
 The purpose of this article is to examine how lower courts in Australia have given content to the 
implied obligation of good faith in one type of relational commercial contract, namely a franchise. 
Although there are other forms of relational commercial contracts,3 franchise contracts possess certain 
additional characteristics that make them worthy of individual consideration. Franchise contracts are 
extremely commonplace, economically significant and have been productive of a body of Australian 
good faith litigation so that detailed analysis is both merited and likely to possess a significant degree 
of practical cogency. This analysis incorporates a number of observations (both general and more 
specific) concerning the likely content of the implied common law obligation of good faith in 
contractual performance and enforcement as it impacts specifically on commercial franchisors. 
 
∗ Research for this article forms part of the author’s SJD studies at the Queensland University of Technology. 
• B Econ, LLB(Hons) (Qld), LLM (QUT); Solicitor, Queensland; Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology. 
1 Dixon B, “Common Law Obligations of Good Faith in Australian Commercial Contracts – A Relational Recipe” (2005) 33 
ABLR 87. 
2 Employing an aspect of Macneil’s essential contract theory, namely his assertion that legally enforceable contracts exist on a 
continuum ranging from highly discrete relations at one end of the continuum to highly relational relations at the other end: 
Macneil IR, “Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries” (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 877 at 894-
896. 
3 Such as distributorships, agency relationships, partnerships, joint ventures and long-term leases: Bobux Marketing Ltd v 
Raynor Marketing Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 506 at [42]. See, also, Goetz CJ and Scott RE, “Principles of Relational Contracts” 
(1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 1089 at 1091. 
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 Finally, the article canvasses the challenge that the implied obligation of good faith poses for the 
High Court, and the critical role that the reasonable expectations of the contractual parties may play in 
resolving this conundrum. 
Background 
Individual franchises may operate under a variety of business models, but all models involve a way of 
distributing goods and/or services. Of the various models, perhaps the most well known type of 
franchising is “business-format” franchising where a franchisee operates under a business format 
created by the franchisor.4 A business format franchise will involve an ongoing business relationship 
between the parties that may include product, training, service, trademarks, other intellectual property 
rights, marketing and advertising strategies and plans, operating manuals and standards and quality 
control.5 Typically, the franchise agreement provides for a relatively long-term relationship of five to 
10 years6 with an option or options for renewal. 
 Despite only having come into widespread use as an organisational form in the last 50 or so 
years,7 the use of franchises and the franchising sector is now blossoming in Australia (as is the case 
world-wide). The boast has been made that Australia is “the most franchised country in the world”.8 
A franchise and service export industry specialist from Austrade has noted that the Australian 
franchise sector has an annual turnover of more than $80 billion, and employs over 600,000 people.9 
There are more than 700 Australian franchisors covering a wide range of products and services.10 This 
sector also generates over $290 million in annual export income for Australia.11 Part of the reason for 
the continued growth of the Australian franchise sector is that franchises appeal to the Australian 
desire to “be your own boss”, offering liberation from being a mere employee.12 Franchising also 
means that a franchisee is the boss of a business which has the backing of an established franchisor. A 
franchisee takes comfort in the fact that a far smaller percentage of franchised outlets will fail than 
non-franchised outlets. In Australia, a representative of the Franchise Council has recently noted that 
franchises have surged in popularity as four in five succeed compared with a 75% failure rate among 
traditional small businesses.13 In America, within one year of beginning operation, 38% of individual 
start-ups fail compared to less than 4% of franchised outlets.14 
THE NATURE OF THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP15 
In the context of an implied obligation of good faith, if the content of the implied obligation is a 
product of contractual context and the reasonable expectations engendered by that context,16 it is 
 
4 Hadfield GK, “Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts” (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 927 
at 928. Hadfield also refers to product or trade name franchising. 
5 Being some of the features of a business format franchise as identified by the US Department of Commerce as referred to by 
Hadfield, n 4 at 932. 
6 Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce Survey of Franchising in Australia: Supplement to the Franchising Task 
Force Report (1991) Franchising in Australia and Abroad, Report to the Minister for Small Business and Customs, The Hon 
David Beddall MP (1992) p 26 as referred to by Taylor VL, “Contracts With the Lot: Franchises, Good Faith and Contract 
Regulation” [1997] NZLR 459 at 466. 
7 Hadfield, n 4 at 928. Franchising has been described as the quintessential 20th century form of industrial organisation: Taylor, 
n 6 at 461. 
8 Abernethy, “Franchising Seen as a Wave of Future for Small Businesses”, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney) (27 
June 1995) p 44 as referred to by Taylor, n 6 at 462. 
9 Figures quoted by Scott C, “New Guides for Booming Franchise Sector”, Findlaw, 
http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/default.asp?task=read&Ibid=19243&site=LE at 25 March 2004. 
10 Richardson M, “Why Franchises Have Surged in Popularity Here”, The Courier Mail (Brisbane) (25 August 2004) Business 
Section, p 1. 
11 Figures quoted by Scott, n 9. 
12 Robertson, “Steve’s Ready to Set Up Franchise”, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney) (27 June 1995) p 42 as referred 
to by Taylor, n 6 at 463. 
13 Comment attributed to Richard Evans of the Franchise Council, as quoted by Richardson, n 10. 
14 Iglesias J, “Comment: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Franchises” (2004) 40 Hous L Rev 
1423 at 1430. 
15 For a more detailed treatment of the nature of the franchise relationship refer to Hadfield, n 4. 
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appropriate to start with an examination of the nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The 
franchise agreement signed by franchisee and franchisor represents far more than a simple bilateral 
contract.17 Implicit (if not explicit)18 in a franchise is the relational nature of the arrangement.19 
Franchises are continuing transactions rather than “one-shot deals”.20 Both franchisor and franchisee 
are involved in what is often a long-term relationship where the basis for economic gain will be on-
going harmony and commitment to a common cause. The long term, mutual obligations of the parties, 
in pursuance of what amounts in substance (if not legal form) to a joint venture, are dependent upon 
co-ordinated action and cooperation.21 For their mutual economic benefit, both the franchisee and the 
franchisor have an interest in the franchise relationship succeeding although the nature of the 
relationship remains “inherently vertical – the essence of franchise duplication [being] ultimately 
franchisor control over the way in which franchisees run their business”.22 The comment is accurately 
made that the franchisee puts “his or her economic fate into the hands of another (the franchisor)”.23 
 For these reasons, a franchise agreement will typically display most of the features of a relational 
contract that Macneil described.24 A common feature of franchise agreements25 is that it is difficult to 
allocate optimally all risks at the time of contracting due to the possibility of unforeseen 
contingencies. Franchise agreements may be characterised by a degree of contractual 
incompleteness26 due to the intertwined nature of the ongoing relationship between the contractual 
parties,27 the difficulty for the parties of drafting a highly specified contract28 (not to mention the 
likely high cost of drafting a complete contract)29 and also the common desire of the franchisor to 
retain a high degree of control to counter certain risks.  
 A franchisor runs the risk that the actions of a franchisee may reduce significantly the 
“accumulated reputation capital of the franchisor by failing to maintain quality controls”.30 In 
addition, a franchisor runs the risk of “free-riding” by a franchisee. Franchise free-riding has been 
described in the following terms: 
A franchisee is inclined to make decisions about how much effort to put into the business based on the 
profits that will accrue directly to her in her own outlet. She is not inclined to take into account that, 
because customers will make judgments about the quality of the entire franchise system based on their 
experience at an outlet, cost-saving reductions in quality at her outlet will affect the overall value of the 
trademark and thus the profits of other franchisees and the franchisor. If all franchisees, facing the 
same incentives, act in this way, the value of the trademark will suffer dramatically.31 
 
16 The suggestion of Dixon, n 1. 
17 Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bigola Enterprises Ltd (1999) 8 TCLR 612 at [236] (Hammond J). 
18 Some commentators would suggest that franchises are explicitly relational contracts: Taylor, n 6 at 459. 
19 Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bigola Enterprises Ltd (1999) 8 TCLR 612 at [236] (Hammond J). 
20 Taylor, n 6 at 459. 
21 These requirements of co-ordinated action and cooperation were regarded by the Privy Council in Dymocks Franchise 
Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 NZLR 289 as critical in the ultimate classification of the franchisee’s conduct as being 
repudiatory (at [63]). 
22 Taylor, n 6 at 467. 
23 Corones S, “Implied Good Faith and Unconscionability in Franchises: Moving Towards Relational Contract Theory” (2000) 
28 ABLR 462 at 467. 
24 The success of the relationship may well be dependent on a level of future cooperation in both performance and further 
planning: Macneil IR, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and 
Relational Contract Law” (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854 at 904. 
25 For a fuller exposition of the common features of franchise contracts, refer to Paterson JM, “Good Faith in Commercial 
Contracts? A Franchising Case Study” (2001) 29 ABLR 270. 
26 One commentator has described franchise contracts as being “paradigmatically incomplete”: Hadfield G, “The Second Wave 
of Law and Economics: Learning to Surf” in Richardson M and Hadfield G (eds), The Second Wave of Law and Economics 
(1999) p 60. 
27 Barnett RE, “Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational Theory of Contract” (1992) 78 Va L Rev 1175 at 
1200. 
28 Paterson, n 25 at 283. 
29 Hadfield, n 4 at 986. 
30  Hadfield, n 4 at 928. 
31  Hadfield, n 4 at 949-950. 
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 On the other hand, there are risks involved in entering a franchise relationship for franchisees. 
Typically, a franchisee will incur considerable costs in setting up the franchise by a potential 
requirement to pay a considerable franchise fee, specialised equipment and inventory acquisition and 
other set-up costs. These costs of the franchisee are frequently described as “sunk costs”, as they may 
not ultimately be recoverable if the franchisee goes out of business, for any reason.32 Sunk costs may 
be threatened by a franchisor’s opportunistic exercise of a broad contractual discretion. The mutuality 
of the franchise relationship is evidenced by franchisors risking the value of their reputation capital 
“in exchange for shifting sunk investments to franchisees”.33 
 Unfortunately, although franchises may involve mutuality it is not necessarily a relationship 
between equals. The relationship is frequently one where there is a power imbalance. The imbalance 
is often a reflection of the franchisee’s business inexperience and the consequent need to rely on the 
franchisor’s relative superiority.34 The potential franchisee will also commonly suffer from a 
disparate level of economic leverage and information.35 Reflective of this power imbalance, the 
franchisee will commonly be expected to sign a “franchisor-developed standardized agreement that 
slants the benefits towards the franchisor36 and leaves the franchisee with few options to protect the 
franchisee’s own interests”.37 There in fact seems to be a strong perception that the standard form 
contract is an integral part of the franchise relationship and the franchisor’s refusal to negotiate is a 
hallmark of the franchise relationship being purchased.38 Being in a superior position, the franchisor 
will usually maintain tight control over the franchise by reserving discretionary power to the 
franchisor while binding a franchisee to explicit standards.39 Reflective of the one-sided nature of 
these agreements,40 there is little reciprocity of contractual obligation.41 Very few specific obligations 
will be cast on the franchisor by comparison to the great weighting of the clauses towards the 
franchisee’s obligations.42 Extremely detailed operations and procedures manuals (or some variant of 
these) will commonly be the source of the explicit standards that a franchisee is expected to attain, 
with these manuals frequently being contractually incorporated as part of the franchise agreement, 
such that any failure to comply with a standard specified in a manual will constitute a breach of the 
agreement.43  
 The incompleteness of the typical franchise agreement, as evidenced by the relative absence of 
specific obligations cast on the franchisor and the significant contractual discretions reserved to the 
franchisor, is a manifestation of the franchisor’s desire to retain the level of control necessary to 
protect the franchisor’s own position and also the franchisor’s desire to create an agreement 
sufficiently flexible for it to be capable of regulating what is usually a long-term relationship where 
market conditions may change. One commentator has even argued, consistent with these 
observations, that a franchise contract is “necessarily incomplete”.44 While an incomplete contract of 
this nature may be seen to adequately protect a franchisor’s position, it clearly provides very little 
protection for the franchisee’s sunk costs. In fact, consistent with the “slanted” nature of many 
 
32  Hadfield, n 4 at 951. 
33 Hadfield, n 4 at 986. 
34 Hadfield, n 4 at 961. 
35 Taylor, n 6 at 467. 
36 In Kellcove Pty Ltd v Australian Motor Industries Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Woodward J, 6 July 1990) 
there is express judicial reference (pp 171-172) to the franchise arrangement between Toyota and its dealers being loaded 
heavily in favour of Toyota. 
37 Iglesias, n 14 at 1424. 
38 Hadfield, n 4 at 961. 
39 Iglesias, n 14 at 1436. 
40 Described elsewhere as the “captive nature of franchise agreements”: Gunasekara G, “Good Faith, Repudiation and 
Franchise Agreements” [2002] NZLJ 453 at 454. 
41 Taylor, n 6 at 468. 
42 Hadfield, n 4 at 943. 
43 As was the case in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 
(Hasluck J) at [17]. 
44 B Klein, “Transaction Cost Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements” (1980) 70 Am Econ Rev 356 as referred to 
by Hadfield, n 4 at 947. 
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franchise agreements, there is undoubtedly scope for contractually opportunistic behaviour by 
franchisors. 
 The risk of opportunism has been well recognised in the United States good faith jurisprudence: 
Opportunism in the law of contracts usually signifies one of two situations. First, there is effort to 
wring some advantage from the fact that the party who performs first sinks costs, which the other party 
may hold hostage by demanding greater compensation in exchange for its own performance. Second, 
there is an effort to take advantage of one’s contracting party in a way that could not have been 
contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.45 
 These general comments concerning the possibility of contractual opportunism are particularly 
apposite in the franchise context. By way of counter, it has been suggested that a franchisor’s concern 
for reputation and a desire to sell more franchises may act as a brake on opportunism.46 While this 
suggestion may appear plausible, the observation that the danger of abuse is inherent in the very 
structure of franchising47 seems to be well made. Despite the argument that opportunistic or 
unscrupulous franchisors will be effectively sanctioned by the “market”, the theory of “reputational” 
sanctioning assumes that information about franchising abuses will circulate freely and be available to 
potential franchisees; but there is little empirical evidence of this.48 In practical terms, it appears that 
the inherent structural potential for conflict results in a commercial contractual environment where 
allegations of a breach of the implied obligation of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement will arise, of necessity. Consistent with this suggestion, the results of a previous survey 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics revealed that 18% of franchisors were party to litigation with 
franchisees at the time the survey was conducted.49 
TYPES OF FRANCHISE DISPUTES 
In the United States, litigation arising from franchise contracts is voluminous. Notwithstanding this, 
Hadfield has observed that there are only two basic types of franchise dispute.50 First, there are 
disputes concerning a franchisee’s compliance with a franchisor’s established operating requirements. 
This type of dispute, consistent with a franchisor’s desire to protect its reputation capital and prevent 
franchisee free-riding, may lead to a franchisor exercising a right of termination. When the right of 
termination is exercised, the good faith issue will be whether the franchisor possessed an ulterior, or 
opportunistic, motive for termination. 
 The second type of dispute, identified by Hadfield, is a dispute about a franchisor changing the 
franchise system’s operating requirements or design. The franchisor’s open-ended discretion to make 
these changes is usually preserved by the franchise agreement consistent with the control that a 
franchisor usually wishes to retain for the life of the franchise. In this type of dispute, the good faith 
issue will be the extent to which a franchisee is required to comply with, or suffer, the franchisor’s 
changes in instances where the changes may be seen to benefit the franchisor (or other franchisees) at 
the franchisee’s expense, cognisant, in particular, of the franchisee’s sunk costs. 
 In Australia, although good faith franchise litigation is more circumscribed, it is submitted that 
the same two basic types of dispute may be identified. In addition to termination disputes, disputes 
about franchise territory fall within the rubric of Hadfield’s second type of dispute. To resolve both 
types of disputes, Australian courts have invoked the implied term of good faith. This approach is 
often a consequence of franchise contracts being necessarily incomplete. Gaps need to be filled in 
order to resolve disputes. In using the implied obligation of good faith to fill these gaps, it has been 
observed generally that the basis of the obligation appears to be the reasonable expectations of the 
 
45 Industrial Representatives Inc v C P Clare Corp 74 F 3d 128 at 129-130, 132 (7th Cir 1996) as referred to by Farnsworth 
EA, “Ten Questions About Good Faith and Fair Dealing in United States Contract Law” [2002] AMPLA Yearbook 1 at 20. 
46 Klein, n 44, as referred to by Hadfield, n 4 at 978. 
47 Hadfield, n 4 at 969. 
48 Taylor, n 6 at 473. 
49 Lawson, “High Level of Franchising Litigation Doubted”, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney) (27 July 1994) p 49 as 
referred to by Taylor, n 6 at 474. 
50 Hadfield, n 4 at 977-978. 
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parties.51 The question arises whether the reasonable expectations of the contractual parties should be 
equated with a “business judgment” approach that has been judicially adopted in certain instances. To 
consider this question it is necessary to consider the implications of the so called “business judgment” 
approach. This issue will be examined from the perspective of both parties to the franchise. 
“Business judgment” approach – from a franchisor’s perspective 
Is a franchisor required to justify the exercise of all contractual rights as being legitimate business 
decisions? The reason this question arises is that some American courts52 favour an approach whereby 
there will be no breach of the good faith obligation if the franchisor has made a legitimate business 
decision53 or a decision that conforms with good business practice even if the franchisee may suffer 
some detriment.54 This approach is justified in American good faith jurisprudence on the basis that a 
“franchise relationship is inherently a business relationship”.55 If the decision may be justified by an 
economic reason, the obligation of good faith will not have been breached.56 
 In a number of United States franchise decisions this business judgment approach is quite 
explicit.57 By way of example, in American Mart Corp v Joseph E Seagram & Sons 824 F 2d 733 at 
734 (9th Cir 1987) it was stated: 
We interpret the good faith and good cause requirement ... as embodying both an objective and a 
subjective element. In order to show that there was good cause for termination, the franchisor must 
establish the existence of a sufficient business justification for its actions: specifically, it must 
demonstrate the existence of a well founded objective ground for the termination based upon 
compelling business reasons.58 
Defences based on this type of approach are not without precedent in Australia. Although not a 
franchise decision, in Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, a defence based on a 
legitimate business judgment was successfully employed by a party facing an allegation of a lack of 
good faith. Overlook ran a business involving the acquisition and on-selling of television program 
content. After protracted negotiations, documentation was signed for the supply by Overlook to 
Foxtel of two non-English language channels for dissemination through Foxtel’s pay television 
system. Each of these non-English language channels was an “add-on”, meaning that subscribers 
requiring these channels would have to subscribe for the basic package, as a means of obtaining the 
desired non-English language channel as an additional item in the total subscription. Every subscriber 
paid a fixed monthly sum for the basic package and a further monthly sum for each add-on. 
 The price initially charged for each add-on was $19.95 per month. Some nine or ten months later, 
Foxtel acted to reduce the price charged for each add-on to $9.95 per month. Amongst other reasons, 
Overlook was concerned as the reduction in price caused a severe reduction in revenue to Overlook 
which could not be overcome without a significant increase in subscriber numbers. By the closing 
stages of the trial, the claim that was most vigorously asserted was a claim in contract based on an 
alleged breach of an implied term obliging Foxtel to act in good faith towards Overlook, should 
 
51 See, eg, Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 at 367; Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd 
(Burger King) [2001] NSWCA 187 at [169] – [171]; Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [83]. 
52 The approach is by no means universal. This remains a common problem with American good faith jurisprudence. See, eg, 
Hunter HO, “The Growing Uncertainty About Good Faith in American Contract Law” (2004) 20 JCL 50 at 51. 
53 American decisions concerning legitimate business judgment are not confined to good faith in a franchise relationship. This 
approach has also been manifested in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship. See, eg, Dickey v Philadelphia Minit-Man 
Corp 105 A 2d 580 (Pa 1954) where the tenant made a legitimate business decision which had the effect of reducing the 
landlord’s entitlement, under the lease, to a percentage of gross receipts. Although gross receipts were reduced, the tenant’s 
profit rose. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held there was no breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. This decision is referred to by Peden E, “Contractual Good Faith: Can Australia Benefit From the American 
Experience?” (2003) 15 Bond LR 175 at 179. 
54 Burger King Corp v Agad 941 F Supp 1217 at 1222 (ND Ga 1996) as referred to by Iglesias, n 14 at 1446. Reference may 
also be made to Hadfield, n 4 at 980-984. 
55 Picture Lake Campground v Holiday Inns 497 F Supp 858 at 869 (E D Va 1980) as referred to by Hadfield, n 4 at 981. 
56 Svela v Union Oil Co of Cal 807 F 2d 1494 at 1501 (9th Cir 1987) as cited by Iglesias, n 14 at 1446. 
57 Refer generally to Hadfield, n 4 at 984. 
58 A quotation referred to by Hadfield, n 4 at 984. 
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Foxtel decide to change the price charged to subscribers for the non-English channels (Overlook v 
Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [13]). 
 For its part, Foxtel argued successfully that it made a legitimate business judgment with a view to 
increasing its share of the non-English channels for the benefit of both contractual parties. Although 
Foxtel recognised that the short-term result would be a fall in revenue affecting both parties, its long-
term hope was that increased penetration of the relevant market would reap suitable commercial 
rewards for all concerned. 
 A corollary of this approach may be that, if a franchisor does not hold a legitimate business 
reason, the exercise of the contractual right can be challenged.59 The potential need to show legitimate 
business reasons for all changes that may be introduced into a franchise has been observed to be 
costly and may also introduce considerable uncertainties for franchisors as they attempt to second-
guess how a court may assess the merits of their contractual actions.60 
 Although this issue has not been aired directly in any Australian franchise decisions, any such 
requirement would seem tantamount (at least from the franchisor’s perspective) to an obligation to 
exercise contractual rights reasonably. It has been noted elsewhere that judicial equation of “an 
obligation of reasonableness and one of good faith is misconceived”.61 Although many decisions 
undoubtedly will be able to be justified on business or commercial grounds, a franchisor will not run 
foul of the good faith obligation where rights are exercised for other reasons, provided the franchisor 
acts honestly and does not act in a manner entirely inimical to the reasonable expectations engendered 
when the relationship was first formed. 
 Although not arising from a franchise relationship, the judgment of Finkelstein J in Garry Rogers 
Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-703 is nevertheless illustrative. The 
decision involved another form of relational commercial contract, a car dealership. Notice of 
termination of the dealership was given for the dealer’s failure to comply with a new marketing 
program. Even though the dealer subsequently indicated that it would comply, the notice of 
termination was not withdrawn by the supplier. In finding that the supplier’s conduct was neither 
unconscionable (under s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) nor indicative of a lack of good 
faith, Finkelstein J directly acknowledged the importance of the contractual relationship (at 43,016): 
Many relationships can only operate satisfactorily if there is mutual trust and confidence. Once that 
confidence and trust has broken down the position is not easily restored. It is not unconscionable to 
terminate a relationship where that trust and confidence has been undermined. 
 The significance of this decision lies in the recognition that a contractual right may be exercised, 
in good faith (and without unconscionability, in this instance), based on considerations apart from 
those that may strictly be characterised as “business” or “commercial” in nature. 
“Business judgment” approach – from a franchisee’s perspective 
The discussion of the “business judgment” approach to this date has focused on whether this approach 
may be too restrictive from a franchisor’s perspective. However, from a franchisee’s perspective, the 
business judgment approach may function as a two-edged sword. The strict adoption of this approach 
would suggest that a franchisor acts in good faith if the exercise of a contractual right, if challenged, 
can be supported by an apparently “plausible business justification”62 notwithstanding that the 
exercise of the right may disregard entirely the franchisee’s sunk costs. The limitations of this 
approach, and its failure to acknowledge the reasonable expectations engendered by a franchise 
relationship, have been recognised: 
 
59 In the franchise context see, eg, Paterson, n 25 and Giles S and Hipwell G, “Franchising and the Trade Practices Act: 
Disclosure, Good Conduct, Good Faith and Good Luck” [2001] LIJ 67 at 69. This issue has also been canvassed in the context 
of lender’s rights to repayment on demand: Paterson JM, “Limits on a Lender’s Right to Repayment on Demand: Construction, 
Implication and Good Faith?” (1998) 26 ABLR 258. 
60 Paterson, n 25 at 291. 
61 Peden E, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (2003) p 163. 
62 Hadfield, n 4 at 981. 
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 The business judgment approach rejects any scrutiny of whether the decision results in the 
extraction of sunk costs from the franchisee, or of whether the franchisor’s decision is one that is 
profitable to the franchisor only at the expense of the franchisee’s investments. The problem with this 
approach should now be clear: By enforcing the franchise contract in this way, courts fail to protect 
fully one half of the interest necessary to support the franchise relationship.63 
 Comments of this type, together with the limitations of business judgment approach from the 
franchisor’s perspective (as previously explored), clearly support what has been observed to be the 
underlying basis of the Australian implied obligation of good faith, namely the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.64 In the context of an incomplete contract, such as a franchise, the 
adoption of any other approach, be it “business judgment”, constructional or otherwise, does not have 
the flexibility to resolve the difficult contractual disputes that arise and will not be truly reflective of 
the nature of the franchise contractual relationship, a relationship that is both “highly intimate and 
interdependent”.65 
AUSTRALIAN GOOD FAITH FRANCHISE LITIGATION 
The issue of contractual good faith has been raised in a number of Australian franchise decisions. 
Notable decisions that feature in the conclusions drawn in this article include Burger King [2001] 
NSWCA 187; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) 
Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 253; 178 ALR 304; and Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd 
[2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286. The significance of these decisions is that, in all 
instances, the franchisee succeeded as the franchisor was pursuing more than the franchisor’s 
legitimate business interests, or, putting it another way, the franchisor was acting in a manner that 
would not be within what was reasonably expected by the franchisee when the agreement was 
formed. 
 Clearly, the key practical issue will be to determine what is, or is not, a business interest that may 
be regarded as legitimate and the exact parameters of reasonable expectations in this form of 
commercial contract. With this in mind, it is appropriate to discuss an instance where the franchisee 
was unsuccessful. Although somewhat short on legal analysis (due to the findings of fact that were 
made), a number of important practical insights may be gained from the decision of the Victorian 
Supreme Court in Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310. 
 Mr Hackett, through his company Far Horizons Pty Ltd (Far Horizons), was an independent 
owner/operator of two McDonald’s stores under a licence agreement with the defendant, McDonald’s 
Australian Pty Ltd. It was accepted that a fundamental tenet of the McDonald’s system is that the 
expansion or the opening of new stores is a desirable objective (at [6]). The litigation at hand arose 
from McDonald’s decision to open two new stores near those operated by Far Horizons without 
offering the licences for either store to Hackett or his company. At this time relations between 
McDonald’s and Hackett had deteriorated considerably (at [51]) as a result of what was alleged to 
have been mutinous behaviour by Hackett.66 
 The plaintiffs submitted that McDonald’s were actuated by bad faith as part of a strategy 
designed to apply improper pressure upon the plaintiffs to persuade them to withdraw from the 
McDonald’s system. In this context, the establishment of the new restaurants was described as a 
“pincer movement” (at [13]). Amongst a number of causes of action asserted, the plaintiffs claimed a 
breach of the defendant’s duty not to perform its obligations or to exercise its rights under the licences 
unfairly or in bad faith towards Hackett and Far Horizons (at [13]). For its part, McDonald’s noted 
that the licences in question (which Hackett, an experienced commercial solicitor, had read before 
signing) conferred no right on the licensee to be offered or to be considered for the licence of any new 
store. Further, the licensee had no exclusive right to trade beyond the clearly delineated geographical 
 
63 Hadfield, n 4 at 983. 
64 Refer to “Types of franchise disputes” above. 
65 Hadfield, n 4 at 963. 
66 In their final address counsel for the plaintiffs alleged that decisions were made to discipline Mr Hackett for his mutinous 
behaviour: Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 at [68]. 
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boundaries of the franchise and had no protected or other territorial rights in the contiguous market 
area of the restaurant. 
 McDonald’s considered that it had acted honestly and reasonably in making the impugned 
decisions. Further, McDonald’s vehemently denied that there was a strategy to remove Hackett and 
his corporate alter-ego from the franchise system or to make an example of Hackett to encourage 
other licensees to be submissive to their dictates. Byrne J noted that a substantial portion of the 
plaintiffs’ case relied upon inference rather than evidence of substance. The observation was made 
that “The difficulty in this case is that, as soon as one approaches the facts without a disposition to 
find conspiracy, the suggested conspiracy evaporates” (at [74]). Further, after considering in some 
detail the decisions made by the management of McDonald’s, Byrne J was not satisfied that these 
decisions were made for a purpose other than to further the legitimate interests of McDonald’s (at 
[117]): 
They were not substantially motivated by an intent to prejudice Mr Hackett or his company or to drive 
him from the System or to make an example of him as a warning to would-be dissident licensees. 
 On these findings of fact the plaintiffs’ claims were doomed to failure and judgment was 
delivered for the defendant with costs. The findings of fact made it unnecessary for Byrne J to 
consider in detail the submissions made concerning the implied duty of good faith and the scope of 
the implied obligation. However, these arguments were addressed briefly. Byrne J did not consider 
himself at liberty to depart from the considerable body of case law that had followed the decision in 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 (Renard). 
Accordingly, there was “to be implied in a franchise agreement a term of good faith and fair dealing 
which obliges each party to exercise the powers conferred upon it by the agreement in good faith and 
reasonably, and not capriciously or for some extraneous purpose. Such a term is a legal incident of 
such a contract” (Far Horizons [2000] VSC 310 at [120]). Counsel for McDonald’s had submitted 
that the implication of a term of good faith was excluded by the operation of an “entire agreement” 
clause. Although this was again not a matter that ultimately had to be determined, Byrne J was 
prepared to assume that the obligation had not been so excluded (at [123]). 
 Before leaving a discussion of this judgment, it is worth noting one further issue raised by 
Byrne J (at [130]): 
I leave for another day the case where the impact caused by the new store is such that it effectively 
destroys the business which the impacted operator had bargained for or where the degree of impact is 
such as to give rise to the inference that its opening was for a purpose which might give rise to the 
operation of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
 Although these judicial comments were clearly dicta, it may be suggested that, in their potential 
application, they are representative of a situation where the franchisor may be seen as pursuing more 
than the franchisor’s legitimate business interests. In hindsight, these comments may be regarded as 
typifying the situation that subsequently arose for determination in Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen 
Pty Ltd; Delta Car Rentals Aust Pty Ltd v Bamco Villa Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192 (Bamco Villa).  
 In Bamco Villa [2001] VSC 192, Mandie J of the Victorian Supreme Court had to consider if the 
exercise of various powers under a franchise agreement was in breach of the implied term of good 
faith and fair dealing. Montedeen was the owner of the “Delta Car Rental System”. By a series of 
franchise agreements Montedeen had licensed a number of franchisees to use the system and 
associated trade marks. Bamco Villa was one of Montedeen’s franchisees. 
 In earlier proceedings between the parties the Victorian Court of Appeal determined that Bamco 
Villa, as franchisee, had been granted the exclusive rights to the territory delineated in the franchise 
agreement and that the description of the right as “exclusive” not only prevented Montedeen, the 
franchisor, from licensing another franchisee in respect of the area of activity but also prevented it 
from itself exploiting the rights in question in respect of that area (at [29]). 
 The Court of Appeal also determined that the franchisor had committed a number of breaches of 
the franchise agreement. The breaches were constituted by the franchisor engaging in competition 
with the franchisee in the franchisee’s exclusive territory through its involvement with other 
businesses conducted under the business names “Crown Rent a Car”, “Astoria Rent a Car” and “Real 
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Cheap Car Rentals”. The key aspect of the breaches was obtaining business through the diversion of 
telephone calls advertised as attached to premises within the franchisee’s exclusive territory. 
 There were two proceedings before the court. The first proceeding was an action by Bamco Villa, 
against Montedeen, claiming damages for breach of the franchise agreement. The second proceeding 
was brought by Montedeen and others (the Delta parties), against Bamco Villa seeking a declaration, 
amongst other things, that the franchise agreement had been validly terminated. It is the second 
proceeding that is of interest. The Delta parties had served notices requiring breaches to be remedied 
leading to notices of termination. The notices served relied upon Bamco Villa’s closure of a branch 
from which the franchised business was conducted and its surrender of vacant possession to a 
purchaser of the property, contrary to the written terms of the franchise agreement. 
 In response to the purported termination of the franchise agreement, Bamco Villa pleaded, 
amongst other things (at [154]), that: 
The purported termination was in breach of cl 22.4 of the franchise agreement and of an implied term 
of the franchise agreement that the franchisor would exercise its powers under the franchise agreement 
reasonably, in good faith and not capriciously. 
In support of this plea, Bamco Villa alleged that the conduct of the Delta parties was part of concerted 
campaign intended to force Bamco Villa out of business. In relation to the implied term, Mandie J 
agreed that an implied term did exist as a legal incident of franchise agreements. The term implied 
was that each party to a franchise agreement should exercise the powers conferred upon it in good 
faith and reasonably and not capriciously or for some extraneous purpose (at [162]). In reaching this 
conclusion Mandie J cited with approval Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] 
VSC 310, Renard (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices 
Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1; (1997) 76 FCR 151, Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 
NSWLR 349 and Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru Aust Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-703. 
 Mandie J concluded (at [166]) that it was more probable than not that the franchisor’s conduct 
contributed materially to the franchisee’s financial difficulties that in turn led to closure of the 
premises. In these circumstances: 
the termination was … made in breach of the franchisor’s obligation to exercise the power in good 
faith and reasonably. The opportunity to terminate arose in significant part from the franchisor’s 
conduct in breach of contract, which was intended both to harm Bamco Villa and to benefit the Delta 
parties. 
Breach of the implied term of good faith invalidated Montedeen’s termination of the franchise 
agreement.67 
Franchisees 
The Australian decisions mentioned to date have focused on the potential impact of the implied good 
faith doctrine as it relates to the conduct of franchisors, more particularly what is often the impugned 
conduct of franchisors. The question arises whether good faith obligations, in theory, are equally 
applicable to franchisees. In other words, is the implied common law obligation of good faith a 
mutual obligation?68 Does the relational nature of the franchise arrangement underpin a reasonable 
expectation that the implied good faith obligation is equally applicable to franchisees? As illustrated 
by the result in the Dymocks franchise litigation (Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd 
[2004] 1 NZLR 289), the answer to the preceding question is undoubtedly “yes”. This litigation, in 
 
67 Mandie J also considered that the franchisor had engaged in unconscionable conduct by terminating the franchise agreement. 
However, the primary conclusion was that the termination was ineffective due to breach of the implied term. 
68 This suggestion has certainly been made in the general commercial context: Forklift Engineering Australia Pty Ltd v 
Powerlift (Nissan) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 443. 
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addition to being extremely costly for the Todds,69 serves as a clear warning that franchisees are also 
potentially exposed to the rigours of the implied term of good faith.70 
 Notwithstanding the relevance of the implied obligation to both contractual parties, Australian 
good faith decisions generally concern potential indiscretions by franchisors, rather than franchisees. 
This is consistent with the American experience where most franchise disputes involve allegations 
that franchisors have failed to perform and enforce franchise agreements in good faith.71 For this 
reason, the potential implications of the good faith obligation as they impact upon commercial 
franchisors are treated separately. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL FRANCHISORS 
Whilst commercial franchisors are not obliged to put aside their self-interest or proprietary rights,72 a 
franchisor will not wish to be accused of acting in a manner contrary to the implied obligation of 
good faith in contractual performance and enforcement. Based on Australian decisions to date, it is 
possible to make a number of observations (both general and more specific) concerning the likely 
content of the implied common law obligation of good faith in the context of commercial franchises. 
General observations 
Discretion and the relevance of motive 
As discussed, the nature of a franchise is such that the contract may not be totally specified and the 
franchisor may retain a considerable degree of contractual discretion. As the exercise of a franchisor’s 
contractual discretion may be productive of disputes between the parties, franchisors will need to 
tread cautiously. At a general level, consistent with the nature of the relationship and the reasonable 
expectations that relationship will usually engender, a franchisor is not required to act in a 
contractually altruistic manner or in a manner akin to a fiduciary.73 The franchisor is not required to 
subordinate the franchisor’s own business or other interests to those of the franchisee.74 However, it 
must also be accepted that the franchisor’s interests arise in the context of an interdependent, mutual 
relationship where the franchisee reasonably expects that regard will be paid to the franchisee’s 
legitimate interests. For this reason, while a franchisor is entitled to have regard to the franchisor’s 
own interests in exercising contractual discretion, discretion may not be exercised for a purpose 
demonstrably extraneous to the contract,75 in clear disregard of the existing contractual 
arrangements,76 with a view to preventing the franchisee from performing the franchisee’s contractual 
obligations,77 in a way likely to cause the franchisee’s rights to become nugatory, worthless or 
seriously undermined78 or in any other manner contrary to the reasonable expectations that the 
franchise relationship engenders. Although a franchisor is not strictly required to demonstrate that any 
decision accords with a “business judgment” approach,79 if the exercise of the discretion has both an 
honest basis and an explanation that is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of both 
contractual parties80 it is unlikely to be contrary to the implied obligation of good faith.81 
 
69 With legal costs exceeding $4,000,000 this was one of the most expensive commercial disputes in New Zealand legal 
history: Gunasekara, n 40 at 453. 
70 It is noteworthy that the suggested mutuality of the implied common law contractual obligation of good faith has a statutory 
equivalent. Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) imposes a requirement for both parties to act in good faith in 
their dealings with each other. This observation was also made by Hasluck J in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty 
Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [372]. 
71 Iglesias, n 14 at 1445, footnote 201. 
72 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [148], [353]. 
73 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [67]. 
74 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [65]. 
75 Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 at [185]. 
76 Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 at [318]. 
77 Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 at [310]. 
78 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [83]. 
79 Refer to “ ‘Business judgment’ approach a franchisor’s perspective”, above. 
80 For example, if the decision may be justified by reference to the common welfare of the parties: Overlook v Foxtel [2002] 
Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [98]. 
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 Even if a franchisor has total or “sole” discretion concerning the exercise of any contractual right, 
the franchisor may need to be able to demonstrate good cause before exercising that discretion.82 As 
demonstrated by Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, the fact that the exercise of a contractual power is 
said to be within the “sole” discretion of the party exercising the power should not be assumed to be 
sufficient, of itself, to exclude the implied obligation of good faith.83 To successfully “opt out” of the 
implied obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement the clause may need to 
be quite specific in its operation.84 
 The most common allegation of conduct contrary to a good faith requirement will require the 
court to examine the motive for the exercise of a contractual right to determine if the right is being 
exercised “capriciously or for some extraneous purpose”.85 Consistent with previous observations, it 
is suggested that a contractual right will be exercised capriciously where there is no rational basis for 
the exercise of the right or no explanation for the exercise of the right86 that is in accordance with the 
parties’ reasonable expectations. The selfish exercise of a contractual right calculated to destroy the 
contractual position of the counter-party will be contrary to the implied obligation of good faith.87 
Nevertheless, to succeed in a claim of this type, the plaintiff will need to produce compelling 
evidence of motive. 
 As was the case in Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 an 
argument based on inference, rather than evidence of substance, is unlikely to succeed. If a franchisee 
is able to produce compelling proof that the sole or dominant motive of a franchisor was for a purpose 
totally inimical to the reasonable expectations of the contractual parties, engendered when the 
relationship was formed, the prospects of successful reliance on the implied term will increase 
dramatically. A franchisor’s conduct that is deliberately calculated to damage the franchisee’s 
business will be regarded as inconsistent with a proper relationship between franchisor and franchisee 
and will be demonstrative of a lack of good faith.88 
Other general observations 
In addition to comments concerning contractual discretion and the relevance of motive, it is possible 
to make a number of other general observations. 
 First, the mere fact that a franchisee may suffer financially as a result of a franchisor’s decision is 
not, in itself, sufficient to constitute a breach of the good faith obligation.89 This proposition is clearly 
illustrated by Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 where the court 
received undisputed evidence that the opening of the second McDonald’s restaurant would have an 
initial impact on sales at the existing restaurant so that sales were expected to decline between 6% and 
9% (at [12]). 
 Second, where multiple franchises have been granted, the common franchisor must treat 
individual franchisees as consistently as possible, except to the extent that any discriminatory 
treatment arises due to special features or circumstances affecting a particular franchisee.90 This 
approach is consistent with the suggestion of Woodward J in Kellcove Pty Ltd v Australian Motor 
Industries Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Woodward J, 6 July 1990) that “good faith 
 
81 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [83]. 
82 Iglesias, n 14 at 1442. 
83 Although the observation has been made that the alleged “sole discretion” was in fact tempered by the factors expressly 
specified in the agreement itself: Paterson, n 25 at 289. 
84 The “burden of careful contractual planning” falls on the party who wishes to depart from the implied obligation of good 
faith as it is this party that is in the best position to secure the expectations of both contractual parties:Burton SJ, “Breach of 
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith” (1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 369 at 403. 
85 Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 at [120]. 
86 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [73]. 
87 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [73]. 
88 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 304 at [46] 
(Sundberg J). 
89 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [83]. 
90 Paterson, n 25 at 290. 
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requires a franchisor not to discriminate against a particular dealer for no good reason and not to act 
with reckless indifference towards the needs of any particular dealer”.91 
 Third, if a franchise agreement reserves the right for a franchisor to impose changes to the 
manner of operation of the franchise affecting, for example, standards, specifications and/or 
procedures, to comply with the implied obligation of good faith a franchisor should provide advance 
notice of any such changes.92 
SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS 
As mentioned, there are two basic types of franchise disputes. Some part of the content to be 
attributed to the implied term of good faith, as it applies in the context of franchise contracts, may be 
gathered from both these types of dispute, as they have arisen in the Australian context. 
Termination 
The termination of a franchise is a dramatic step and one that should not be undertaken lightly by a 
franchisor.93 In fact, due cause for termination is one of the key legal issues that arises in 
franchising.94 The following observations may be made: 
• If a notice of default relies upon the contents of a report or other document, a copy of that 
document should be provided (particularly if it is requested by the franchisee).95 To avoid any 
allegation of a lack of good faith, the copy of the document should be provided before the notice 
of default is issued.96 A notice of default should not be issued unless there is some basis for 
concluding that default has occurred.97  
• Where a franchisee makes a request for mediation pursuant to Pt 4 of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, this should be undertaken prior to the franchisor exercising any right of termination that 
in turn may lead to litigation.98 The Franchising Code of Conduct is a mandatory industry code99 
which came into effect on 1 July 1998 and applies to franchise agreements entered into on or 
after 1 October 1998. The process for resolving disputes in Pt 4 of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct is mandatory in the sense that once the process is activated by a party, that party may 
insist that the other party attend mediation.100 
• A franchisor may not be at liberty to rely upon technical or minor infringements unless there is a 
clear and persistent course of misconduct.101 A franchisor may be obliged to have regard to the 
reasonable expectations or interests of the franchisee.102 Particularly, in considering commercial 
interests that may legitimately be protected, a franchisor should have regard to the financial 
consequences of the alleged breaches by comparison to the financial consequences of termination 
for the franchisee.103 For example, where the financial consequences to the franchisor are small in 
comparison to the financial consequences of termination for the franchisee, this may be an 
indication that termination is not necessary to protect the franchisor’s legitimate commercial 
interests.104 However, as indicated previously, if there is a clear and persistent course of 
 
91 Paterson, n 25 at 290. 
92 Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 at [181]. 
93 In the United States, most franchise disputes heard by the courts involve claims of wrongful termination: Hadfield, n 4 at 
970. 
94 Hadfield, n 4 at 937. 
95 As in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [123]. 
96 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [171]. 
97 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [265]. 
98 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [398]. 
99 Within the meaning of s 51AE of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The Franchising Code of Conduct was prescribed as 
mandatory by the Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) (Statutory Rules No 162). 
100 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [398].  
101 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [150]. 
102 By analogy to Overlook v Foxtel [2002] Aust Contracts Rep 90-143 at [65] – [67]. 
103 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [381]. 
104 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [381]. 
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misconduct by a franchisee, the mere fact that the financial consequences for the franchisor are 
relatively small should not be seen as a bar to termination. If the position were otherwise, the 
franchisor would be powerless to prevent persistent “free-riding” by franchisees.105 
• In addition to the need to comply at all times with the termination requirements of the 
Franchising Code of Conduct,106 any attempt by a franchisor to terminate and obtain a valuable 
franchise for itself by reliance on trivial, stale or minor breaches107 by a franchisee will be 
carefully scrutinised and is likely to constitute a breach of the implied obligation of good faith.108 
Similarly, a franchisor should not attempt to use the threat of termination with a view to forcing a 
franchisee to dispose of the franchise to the franchisor (pursuant to a right of first refusal)109 for 
under-value.110 If this were not the case, it would mean that very valuable rights could be 
imperilled by the slightest of breaches.111 In a similar manner, a court is likely to intervene if a 
“show cause” procedure is likely to result in the exercise of a substantive contractual right where 
the default alleged is relatively trivial.112 
• In exercising a right of termination, the conduct of the franchisor should not be seen to be 
oppressive in nature, as may be the case if the exercise of the right is actuated by subjective 
considerations beyond those contemplated by the terms of franchise agreement.113 For example, 
where there is compelling evidence that a franchisor is not interested in resolving matters 
genuinely in dispute and is acting in a manner that is only consistent with a subjective desire to 
bring the franchise agreement to an end (for reasons of malice, vindictiveness or retribution), this 
is likely to be indicative of a lack of good faith.114 A franchisor should also exercise considerable 
caution before purporting to terminate a franchise agreement in circumstances where there is a 
degree of ambiguity surrounding the events of default that are relied upon.115 Where at all 
possible, a franchisor should endeavour to substantiate the grounds upon which termination is 
based. By analogy to Renard (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 where the principal’s decision was held to 
be based on “misleading, incomplete and prejudicial information” (at 276 (Meagher JA)), one 
commentator suggests that the obligation of good faith may entail an attempt to verify any 
information on which a decision is based.116 
Territory disputes 
It is common for franchises to delineate a territory that is allocated to a particular franchisee. To the 
extent that it applies to a particular franchise,117 under the Franchising Code of Conduct a franchisor 
must provide a disclosure document providing details, amongst other things, of the franchise site or 
 
105 The problem of “free-riding” is discussed under the heading “The nature of the franchise relationship”, above. 
106 In the case of termination (where there is no breach by the franchisee), cl 22(3) of the Franchising Code of Conduct requires 
a franchisor to give reasonable written notice of the proposed termination, and reasons for the proposed termination, to the 
franchisee. 
107 Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 at [444]. 
108 See, eg, Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd; Delta Car Rentals Aust Pty Ltd v Bamco Villa  PtyLtd [2001] VSC 192. 
In the American context, Iglesias refers to The Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co v River Valley Cookies Ltd 
970 F 2d 273 at 280 (7th Cir 1992) as illustrating the same proposition: Iglesias, n 14 at 1442. 
109 In a review of common franchise provisions it was found that nearly half of the franchisors retained a right of first refusal if 
the franchisee wished to sell the franchise: Hadfield, n 4 at 944. 
110 The contention made in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 
at [385]. 
111 Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 at [183]. 
112 By analogy to Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 and also 
(albeit not in a franchise context) Renard (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 258. 
113 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [393]. 
114 As was the case in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at 
[216]. 
115 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR (Digest) 46-229; [2002] WASC 286 at [396]. 
116 Paterson, n 25 at 275. 
117 Regulation 5 of the Franchising Code of Conduct provides for its application. 
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territory.118 If the franchised business has an expected annual turnover of $50,000 or more, the 
disclosure document must be in accordance with Annexure 1 of the Franchising Code of Conduct.119 
If the expected annual turnover is less than $50,000, the disclosure document must be in accordance 
with Annexure 1 or 2.120 To comply with the requirements of both Annexures, the allocated territory 
should be described as “exclusive” or “non-exclusive” (as the case may be).121 Notwithstanding this 
apparently clear nomenclature, territory disputes are common in the franchise sector. In part, the 
potential for these disputes may be a function of franchisor avarice. When a franchise system is in its 
early stages of development, the success, or otherwise, of a particular location may well be hit or miss 
(elsewhere described as the “location gamble”).122 If the location proves not to be profitable, in the 
usual course it is the franchisee that will suffer, rather than the franchisor. The franchisor may well 
take the view that this is part of the risk assumed by a new franchisee, particularly if the franchise fee 
was correspondingly low. However, if the location proves successful, a temptation may arise for the 
franchisor either to compete itself within the franchisee’s territory or “cannibalise” the existing 
market by granting a further franchise in the territory. With these possibilities in mind, the following 
observations may be made: 
• If the franchised area is labelled or described, in the franchise documentation, as “exclusive”, this 
precludes competition from not only other franchisees but also precludes the franchisor from 
exploiting the rights in question in respect of that area.123 However, the mere description of the 
franchised area as being “non-exclusive” does not impliedly signal a reservation of the right of 
the franchisor to compete. This label may simply indicate that franchises may be granted to other 
franchisees authorising them also to trade in this area.124 Unless the right has been expressly and 
specifically reserved,125 the franchisor cannot compete within the franchisee’s allocated 
territory.126 The conduct of a franchisor who establishes rival businesses in direct competition 
with the franchisee within the franchisee’s exclusive territory or who seeks to obtain business 
through the diversion of telephone calls advertised as attached to premises within the franchisee’s 
exclusive territory will violate the implied obligation of good faith.127 Similarly, the 
establishment of an online business that effectively competes with franchisees within their 
exclusive areas is likely to be offensive.128 It is suggested that these results are entirely consistent 
with the parties’ reasonable expectations. When a franchise is formed, unless the right is 
 
118 Franchising Code of Conduct, reg 6. Section 51AD of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) prohibits a corporation from 
contravening this prescribed mandatory industry code. Any contravention will trigger the right to potential remedies under 
Pt VI of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
119 Franchising Code of Conduct, reg 6.  
120 Franchising Code of Conduct, reg 6. 
121 Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 1, cl 8.1; Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 2, cl 5.1. 
122 Hadfield, n 4 at 974. 
123 Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd; Delta Car Rentals Aust Pty Ltd v Bamco Villa Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192 at [29]. 
This conclusion is consistent with the requirements of the disclosure document under the Franchising Code of Conduct. Should 
the franchisor, or an associate of the franchisor, wish to operate a business that is substantially the same as the franchised 
business within the franchisee’s territory, this reservation will need to disclosed: Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 1, 
cl 8.2(b); Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 2, cl 5.2(b). 
124 By analogy to Softplay v Perpetual Trustee WA [2002] NSWSC 1059. To avoid any argument, this reservation of the right 
of other franchisees to operate a business (within the territory) that is substantially the same as the franchised business should 
be expressly (rather than impliedly) disclosed: Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 1, cl 8.2(a); Franchising Code of 
Conduct, Annexure 2, cl 5.2(a). 
125 In accordance with the Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 1, cl 8.2(b); Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 2, 
cl 5.2(b). 
126 American authority may be found that is consistent with this proposition. See, eg, Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc v 
Sheraton Franchise Corp 139 F 3d 1396 (11th Cir 1998) and Carvel Corp v James Baker 79 F Supp 2d 53 (D Conn 1997) as 
referred to by Garner WM, “Sales of Products and Services Over the Internet in Distribution and Franchise Systems” (Paper 
presented at the American Bar Association Antitrust Section 51st Annual Spring Meeting, Washington D C, April 2-4, 2003) 
p 6. 
127 Part of the impugned conduct of the franchisor in Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd; Delta Car Rentals Aust Pty Ltd 
v Bamco Villa Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192. 
128 By analogy to Dymocks Holdings Pty Ltd v Top Ryde Book Sellers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 390 (Hodgson CJ, 15 May 2000) 
at [68]. 
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expressly reserved, a franchisee does not reasonably expect to compete with the franchisor within 
the franchised area. 
• Even if a franchisor grants a non-exclusive franchise and expressly reserves the right to create 
new franchises within that territory, a franchisor must exercise considerable care before granting 
a new franchise that is likely to compete directly with the existing franchisee129 and create a 
considerable reduction in turnover (or “impact” as it is known in the terminology of 
McDonald’s).130 Consistent with the warning of Byrne J (in dicta) in Far Horizons Pty Ltd v 
McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 where the impact caused by the new store is such that 
it effectively destroys the business which the impacted operator had bargained for, or, where the 
degree of impact is very large, it may well give rise to the inference that its opening was for a 
purpose contrary to the operation of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing.131 
 Although there are no proven examples of this sort of conduct in the Australian good faith 
cases to date, a decision from the United States is illustrative of the sort of conduct that Byrne J 
may have had in contemplation. In Photovest Corp v Fotomat Corp 606 F 2d 704 (7th Cir 1979) 
a franchisee purchased a Fotomat film distribution franchise. The purchase price was relatively 
low as the franchise was in the early stages of its development. Two things then happened. The 
Fotomat franchises proved to be successful and the franchisor discovered that profits from 
franchisor owned outlets were even higher than those generated from the outlets of individual 
franchisees. As a result, the franchisor deliberately set up outlets in close proximity to individual 
franchises that were particularly profitable and stopped providing pick-up and delivery services 
as required by the franchise. Due to these and other actions, profits of individual franchisees were 
dramatically reduced, as was the price at which the franchisor could buy the outlets back.132 In 
these circumstances, the franchisor’s conduct was successfully impugned. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I have suggested elsewhere that an obligation of good faith, in contractual performance and 
enforcement, should be implied, as a matter of law, in commercial contracts that are relational in 
nature, rather than commercial contracts per se.133 This approach would facilitate consideration of the 
commercial, contractual context, cognisant that different commercial contracts “have different 
contexts and values – in particular, that contracts can have strongly discrete or strongly relational 
elements”.134 
 The focus of this article has been the contractual context and values associated with a common 
form of relational commercial contract, the franchise contract. Against this backdrop, a number of 
conclusions have been reached concerning the likely content of the good faith obligation. The 
conclusions reached in the franchise context are consistent with the more general trend of recent 
Australian lower court authority, namely, that the content of the good faith obligation is increasingly 
likely to be based on the reasonable expectations or legitimate interests of the contractual parties.135 
Provided due regard is paid to these expectations or interests, rather than contractual rights being 
opportunistically manipulated, the implied obligation of good faith is unlikely to be breached. Given 
the increasing recognition of the role of reasonable expectations, certain further comments seem 
apposite concerning the future treatment of the implied common law obligation of good faith in 
contractual performance and enforcement as it impacts generally upon commercial contracts. 
 The comment can fairly be made that the legacy of Priestley JA’s seminal judgment in Renard 
(1992) 26 NSWLR 234 is a mixed one. Perhaps in an overenthusiastic retreat from legal formalism, 
 
129 Once again, American authority may be found in support of this proposition. See, eg, Scheck v Burger King Corp 798 F 
Supp 692 at 694 (S D Fla 1992); Re Vylene Enterprises Inc 90 F 3d 1472 at 1477 (9th Cir 1996) as referred to by Garner, 
n 128, p 8. 
130 Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 at [8]. 
131 Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 at [130]. 
132 This decision is referred to by Hadfield, n 4 at 973. 
133 Dixon, n 1. 
134 Feinman JM, “Relational Contract Theory in Context” (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 737 at 743. 
135 Refer to “Types of franchise disputes”, above. 
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Priestley JA may not have aided the prompt resolution of the good faith debate by the invocation of a 
judicial response expressly based on considerations of community standards. The suspicion remains 
that much of the ongoing, good faith debate in Australia may have been averted if Priestley JA had 
invoked the “reasonable expectations” of the contractual parties as the basis of the implied obligation 
rather than “prevailing community expectations” (at 268). Concerns about “amorphous” or “palm 
tree” justice or “litigation floodgates” tend to disappear when the vague concept of community 
standards is removed from the good faith equation and replaced by a concept that is much more 
familiar and comfortable to parties, lawyers and judges alike. 
 If the High Court136 were to accept that the basis of the implied good faith obligation is 
reasonable expectations, rather than community standards, then the introduction of good faith into 
contract law should not be seen as the imposition of a “new morality”137 but merely the adoption of a 
doctrinal approach that, if not of long standing, has been well recognised in recent times.138 In the 
same manner as “doing the right thing”,139 an obligation of good faith, explicitly based on reasonable 
expectations, would have the attraction of being readily understood by people in commerce140 and, if 
confined to commercial contracts that are relational in nature, would be consistent with empirical 
evidence of commercial contractual behaviour.141 
 The express adoption of this approach would have nothing to do with “commercial good 
samaritanism” or “judicial moralism”.142 Commercial contract law would still be fundamentally about 
achieving one’s own ends, but those ends would be “understood largely in terms of the context out of 
which they arise”143 and the reasonable expectations engendered by that commercial context. In the 
specific context of franchise agreements, as evidenced by the conclusions reached in this article, the 
reasonable expectations of the contractual parties have provided the platform for a number of 
Australian courts (lower in the judicial hierarchy) to proscribe certain acts of contractual 
opportunism. The challenge remains at large for the High Court. 
 
 
136 A decision of the High Court is still awaited. In Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council 
(2002) 76 ALJR 436; 186 ALR 289; [2002] HCA 5 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted at [40] that 
whilst the issues respecting the existence and scope of a “good faith” doctrine were important, it was an inappropriate occasion 
to consider them. Kirby J at [89] and Callinan J at [156] also did not consider it necessary to address these issues. 
137 One author has previously suggested that to introduce good faith as part of the law of contract is to impose a new morality: 
Angel JDN, “Some Reflections on Privity, Consideration, Estoppel and Good Faith” (1992) 66 ALJ 484 at 491 as referred to 
by Cole TRH, “Law – All in Good Faith” (1994) 10 BCL 19 at 32. 
138 It has been observed that the protection of reasonable (or legitimate) expectations is now “part of the common rhetoric of 
Australian law”: Finn P and Smith KJ, “The Citizen, the Government and ‘Reasonable Expectations’” (1992) 66 ALJ 139 at 
140. As far as contract law is concerned, Eisenberg, amongst others, has noted that contract law is to a significant extent about 
the protection of reasonable expectations: Eisenberg M, “The Theory of Contracts”, in Bensen P (ed), The Theory of Contract 
Law (2001) p 246. 
139 Seddon N, “Australian Contract Law: Maelstrom or Measured Mutation?” (1994) 7 JCL 93 at 94. 
140 Consistent with the admonition that the law should be concerned not to surprise business people, Seddon notes that where a 
standard is based on common experience and reasonable expectations it is not difficult to know what to do: n 141 at 104, 110. 
141 Relevant empirical studies are referred to by Dixon, n 1. 
142 O’Byrne SK, “Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent Developments” (1995) 74 Canadian Bar Review 70 at 76 
citing the language used by Kelly J in Gateway Realty Ltd v Arton Holdings Ltd (1991) 106 NSR (2d) 180 at 197. 
143 To adapt the words of Feinman, n 136 at 739. 
